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BRIEF

In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ROSE GIBBONS and A. K. TIERNAN,
Appellants,
VS.

R. G. FRAZIER and UTAH COPPER COMPANY, a Corporation,
Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF.

The trial judge's remarks at the time his decision was
announced appear in the Bill of Exceptions, and it will
perhaps serve a double purpose to quote them at this
time. It is a fair epitome of the issues.
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THE COURT: Plaintiffs allege that they, with one
Michael Gibbons and Stephen Hays, as tenants in common, own and are entitled to the possession of Lot 10,
Block 4, Plat A, Wilkes Official Survey of Bingham
Townsite in this county, being a part of McGuire & Company Placer, U. S. Lot 242, and that the same is wrongfully withheld by defendants, after demand therefor.
Defendants deny that plaintiffs, with said Michael
Gibbons and Sltephen Hays, or with any other person,
as tenants in common, or at all, are or ever were entitled
to possession of said pre-m:iSBs, or have or had any right
or title therein; admit that they are in possession thereof, and that they have refused, a£ter demand, to deliver
possession to plaintiffs; allege ownership in fee simple in
the defendant Utah Copper Company, and allege that the
defendant Frazier is its tenant and in posession. They
allege that they and their predecessors have occupied the
premises for over twenty-five years, and paid all taxes
thereon, and on the improvements thereupon, during the
whole of said time, and they plead Sections 6449 and 6450,
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, in bar of plaintiff's action,
and set forth the history of their possession and their
souree of title, and allege that between September, 1924,
and April, 1925, they erected a hospital thereon at a cost
of twenty-three thousand dollars; tha:,t their and their
predecessors' possession was open, notorious and exelusive, and under claim of title, and that with the knowledge
of plaintiffs, they have on several occasions improved
same and erected structures thereon, without notice from
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plaintiffs that they claimed title thereto, until the notice
served by plaintiffs October 30, 1924, after the building
of the present structure thereon was under way, and that
by said delays the plaintiffs are guilty of laches and are
estopped now from claiming title thereto.
The McGuire & Company Placer Claim was located
August 26, 1875. Notice of location was not recorded
until about four and a half years later, and United States
patent issued thereon July 20, 1881, and the patent was
not recorded until nearly sixteen years later, June 12,
1897. By conveyances therefrom, the plaintiffs, and their
associates acquire title thus alleged by them.
The Valentine patent, so-called, to Location "E ",
No. 227, for forty acres, was acquired by David H. Bentley, by United States patent dated July 10, 1876, andrecorded on the 25th of that month.
The two patents are in conflict and Lot 10, Block 4,
Plat A, in controversy herein, is within the conflict area.
In 1900 the County Surveyor made a survey of Bingham Townsite, which was approved in 1904, and from this
survey we get the description in the complaint, and taxes
were thereafter levied by the County Assessor with reference to the descriptions made from that plat.
Plaintiffs paid taxes on the McGuire & Company patent from 1900 to the present time. The valuation was
usually placed at thirty dollars up to 1916. lti was sixty
dollars in 1908, fifty-five dollars in 1916, sixty dollars in
1917, thirty dollars in 1918, and has remained at sixty
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dollars since that time. The defendants and their predecessors paid the taxes on the other patent area at least
from 1897 to date, and separately on Lot 10, Block 4,
Plat A, £rom 1900 to date. From 1896 to 1899, inclusive,
it was assessed as fifty by one one hundred feet and improvements. In 1895 the taxes were paid simply on '' 1
Frame House.''
Both claimants acquire title from conveyances founded on a United States patent, both have paid taxes assessed against the property, and the defendants, and their
predecessors have been in possession of the particular
lot described.
The testimony shoWring that one Maxwell went into
possession of the lot in 1878 or 1880, and remaining

then~

until he sold to Dr. Straup in May, 1899. As to just when
he enclosed the lot, there is no evidence, and the fact
that Maxwell paid taxes only on the house in 1895, would
probably preclude any finding of adverse possession prior
to 1896, but from that time on, they were assessed and
paid and the property was enclosed, that is, their boundaries indicated by an enclosure from about that time.
If the question in this case involved only the property

rights acquired under the patents, the Court might be inclined to the opinion maintained by the plaintiffs, that is,
that the placer patent related back to the original location and established prioriy, but the adverse possession
on the part of the defendants is so clearly established that
the case must be determined on that question.

Two cases have already been tried and appealed to
the Supreme Court and .settled by that tribunal on this
identical question and these have been cited in defendants' brief .and are binding on this court.
Judgment must be for the defendants, no cause of
action.

It will be noted that Judge "Wight at that time seemed
to feel that the defense of adverse possession controlled
the case. He intimated that his inclination was to hold
that the mineral patent gave a superior title over the agricultural patent, although the latter had issued prior in
time. He did not see fit to express his views respecting
the defense of estoppel. However, the Court's formal
findings of fact and conclusions ·of law squarely de~er
mined the case in favor of the defendants on each defense
pleaded in their answer. That is to say: (1) The Court
finds that the agricultural patent passed a superior title
to the mineral patent; (2) the Court finds on the defense
of adverse possession in favor of the defendants; (3) the
Court finds the defense of estoppel in their favor.
\V" e now address our argument in that sequence.

I.
The McGuire & Company Placer Mining Claim was
!ocated August 26, 1875, and United States patent issued
thereon July 20, 1881. It is the appellants' contention
that the issuance of that patent was a conclusive adjud1-

cation by duly constituted authority that in the cliseovNy
of the mining c:laim, in its location and in all matters
precedent to its issuance the owners of the mining claim
had complied with the law. There is in truth no authority
to the contrary and abundant authority in support of
that contention.
The appellants further contend that the authorilic>s
are unanimous in holding that the title derived by patent
to a mining claim relates back to the inception of the
right, i. e., to the diseovery and location, and that in ccn~equence

the appellants' title initiated as of the dale of

the location of the McGuire Plaeer, to-wit:

Aug·L~st ~G,

1875.
On F'ebruary 9, 1876, s1x mouths aftt-r the 1:uumg
elaim had been duly loeated, one Bentley made entry in
the local Land Offiee and deposited Valentine Scrip to
apply on the purchase of the west half of th0 east half
of the northwest quarter of Section 26, asserting that it
was non-mineral ground.

It is of eourse true that there is no provision in the
mining laws for the recordation of mining locations in
any office of the Department of the Interior. Hucl the
law been different in that respect, it may very well be that
the Department would not have entertained Bentley's
applieation. Or, if the law had provicled for notice and
hearing on Bentley's applieation so that the owners of
the mining claim might have had their clay in conrt to
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adverse or protest, the present controversy might have
been determined and be res adjudicata between the parties to this appeal long since, but again such is not the
law.
On July 10, 1876, or nearly five years before the
patent to the McGuire Placer issued, patent issued to
Bentley on his said entry. To a certain extent the area
embraced in the two patents conflicts and unfortunately
the demanded premises in this action lie within the conflict area.

That these plaintiffs have the right to maintain ejectment without joining their co-tenants, Stephen Hays and
Michael Gibbons, is not challenged and indeed it ought
not to be. See Sections 6509 and 6511, Compiled Laws of
Utah, 1917, and Moulton vs. McDermott (Cal.), 22 Pac.
296.
In view of the admitted ouster and demand, the plaintiffs' case in chief was made by pr:oving record title from
original source. The abstract of title, plaintiffs' Exhibit
"A", clearly establishes title in the plaintiffs to the McGuire & Company Placer, U.S. Lot 242.
A photostatic copy of the patent issued to Bentley on
the Valentine Scrip entry is in evidence as defendants'
Exhibit 16.
For the convenience of the Court, we here print the
Act of Congress, approved April 5, 1872, under which
the so-called Valentine Scrip came into being.

Be It Enacted by Uw SL•nate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, In Congress
Assembled:
That the ninth circuit court of the UnitPd States, of
California, be, and hereby is, author1~r.ed aml required to
hear and decide upon the merits, the claim of Thomas B.
Valentine, claiming title, under a :Mexican grant to J'uan
Miranda, to a place called the Rancho Arroyo de San
.Antonio, situated in the County of Sonoma and State of
California in the same manner, and with the same jurisdiction, as if the claim to the said tract of land had been
duly presented to the board of land commissioners um]Pr
the provision of the act entitled, "An act to af"certain and
settle private land claims in tlie State of California," approved March third, eighteen hundred fifty-one and an
appeal had been dt1ly taken from their decision to thP
district court of California by the said Thomas B. V a] entine.
Section 2. That on the said hearing any testimony
heretofore taken before the said board of connnissiouen~.
in relation to said claim on behalf of tlte said claimant,
or the United States, may be read, suhject to all ;just exreptions to its competency; and additional testimony, on
Pither part, may be taken, under the order and direetion
of said circuit court, as to the validity and extent of said
daim.
Section 3. That an appeal sball be taken from 1he
final decision and decree of the said circuit eourt to tlw
Supreme Court of the United States, by either party. in
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accordance with the provisions of the tenth section of
said act of March third, eighteen hundred fifty-one, within six months after the rendition of such final decision;
and a decree under the provisions of this act, in favor of
~aid claim, 'Shall not affect any adverse right or title t(l
the lands described in said decree; but in lieu thereof, the
claimant, or his legal representatives, may select, and
shall be allowed, patents for an equal quantity of the
unoccupied and unappropriated public lands of the
United States, not mineral, and in tracts not le'Ss than the
subdivisions provided for in the United States land laws,
and, if unsurveyed when taken, to conform, when surveyed to the general ·system of United S.tates land surveys ; and the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, shull
be authorized to issue scrip in legal subdivisions, to the
~aid Valentine, or his legal representatives, in aecordance with the provisions of this act: PROVIDED~ that
110 deeree in favor of the said Valentine shall be executed
nor be of any force or effect against any person or perEons; nor shall land scrip or patents issue as hereinbefore
provided, unless the ·said Valentine shall first execute and
deliver to the Commissioner of the General Land Office
:~. deed conveying to the United States, all his right, title
and interest to the lands covered by the said Miranda
grant.
Approved April 5, 1872.
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rrhe proof shows that by mesne conveyances from th<'
patentee, Bentley's title, such as may be, became [,odgecl
in Stephen Hays prior to 1904.
The basis of the defendants' claim of reconl title or
title from original source is a deed from Hays to McCann
of October :3, 1904.

Lest confusion nwy arise, it should be noted, t!Jat
while it is conceued by all parties that Stephen llays \\·~~-''
at the time of the commencement of this action a p;trt
ovvner of the McGuire Placer, lw did 11ot acqaire th:1t interest until 1913. In 1904, when he gave his quit-clailtl
deed to Charles .McCann, Hays had no title to thP ~fe
Guire Placer and all he purported to convey to MC'Cnnn
was a portion of the Valentine Scrip patellt.

So far as record title or title from origiual son ret• i •;
concerned, the claims of tlw respeetive p:H'tit•s lWl~· he
stated as follows:
The location of the mining claim was several lllOPths
prior to the time Bentley, the holder of th0 ~;l'rip. made
bis filing in the Land Office. The date of location ol' t1w
mining claim is July 26, 1875, whereas tlw date of Benth~y 's agricultural entry is February 9, 1876; six or se\'l·ll
months later. However, patent issued to Bentley .July
10, 1876, whereas patent did not issue to the MeClu"rp
Placer until July 30, 1R81. rrhe dPfendants' contention
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that the agricultural patent to Bentley antedating by
five years the mineral patent to the McGuire Placer is
sl.1perior to the mineral patent. The claim of the plaintiffs is that tlwir title initiated by the discovery and location of the mining claim in 1875, seven months before
tl;e agricultural entry; that the subsequent issuance or
patent to the mining claim in 1881 evidences the faet that
the title initiated by the discovery and location in 1876
is valid, and that being so title passed out of the Uu; 1 c>d
States as of July 26th, 1875, with the result that ~when
the agricultural patent issuerl to Bentley in 1876, the
United Stat~)S 'had theretofore by solemn Congressinnal
Act divested itself of the right to convey tWe to Brmtley,
so far at least as the two estates conflict.
To recapitulate:
1:;

The date of the discovery and location of th(' :MeGuire Placer is July 26, 1875.
rl1 lw date• of the agricultural entry IS February 9,
187G.
rrhe date of the agricultural patent is July 10, ] 876.
'l'h(• date of the mineral patent is July 30, 1881.

In support of their contention that the agricultural
patent so prior in time of issuance must be superior to
the sub::equent mineral patent, defendants argue that tl!i•
agricultural patent ex proprio vigore passed title ont of
the United States in 1876, that in conE>equcnce thl~ later
J>~ineral patent conld pass nothing, that the agrienltural
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patent is, under the authorities, not subject to collateral
attack but is a conclusive adjudication against all private parties by the duly constituted agency of the government (the General Land Office), that the land in question
was not mineral in character, was subject to entry by
Bentley and that all conditions preliminary and necessary
existed at and prior to the issuance ,of patent in order to
vest fee simple title in the patentee.
Of course, everything that can be said in respect to
the immunity of the agricultural patent from collat<·ral attack can also be said and has frequently been said
respecting mineral patents, and of course, in this case we
do have a mineral patent in the patent to the McGuire
& Company Placer; so right there, on this branch of the
case, the issue is clearly drawn. Is the controlling p1·i-·
ority the date of discovery and location of the mining
claim on which a patent finally issued or is it the dat<> of
the issuance of the agricultural patent?
By the mineral land laws, public lands containing valuable mineral deposits are open to exploration, occupancy
and acquisition; and as an inducement to effective exploration the discoverer is given the right to locate a substant,ial area embracing his discovery and to hold the same
and extract minerals without payment of rent or royalty
so long as he puts $100.00 worth of labor or improvements upon the claim each year, and is also given the
right to demand and receive a patent at a small sum per
acre after he puts $500.00 worth of labor or Improvements upon the claim.
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The discovery of minerals is the important thing and
it is the discoverer who is the object of the Government's
bounty. The provisions respecting location and the igi'Uance of patent are to large extent ministerial and are
found in the statutes rather for the purpose of providing
orderly procedure and recordation, defining rights acquired by discover·y tlian that in and of themselves the
location or patent issued thereon initiates title.
And so it ha:.s been consistently and universally held
at all times and in all courts since the passage of thH Act
of Congress of .July 1866, that the rights of a mineral
claimant initiate and attach by virtue ofhis discovery of
mineral in the public lauds and. that the rights so attaching are acquired by the Act of Congress itself, that the
Act of Congress itself is his muniment of title, and that
the patent subsequently acquired "adds but little to his
security.''
It becomes necessary therefore to define the rights
aequired by the discoverer as a result of his discov?ry
of minerals in the public lands and as Mr. Lindley says:
"The decisions of the C'ourts, both state and federal, an~
quite harmonious.''
Prior to the issuance of patent, the locator caanot
be said to own the fee simple title in its broadest sense
although, as has been stated, by virtue of the fact of disc·overy and location anrl from the very time of discovery,
the discoverer by tlle terms of the Congressional Act itself acquires a certain estate. The fee simple title, residing in the government, passes only at the time of sale and
payment of the purchase price by the locator-in other
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words at the time of final entry and payment into the local
land office of the statutory price per acre. It is the p J.tent which follows that evidence the fee simple title then
~md thereby acquired. In the meantime, however, between the time of discovery and issuance of patent, by
virtue of the Act of Congress the locator has acquired
a right and it has been said that the naked legal fee simple title is held during that time by the Government in
trust for the locator to be conveyed to him upon his application and after compliance by him with the terms prescribed by the mineral land laws. Lindley, 3d Edition,
Section 539, top of page 1201.
The Government having declared that mineral lands
are free and open to exploration and purchase and a positive compact having been made by the Government with
the discoverer and locator, whereby the latter upon compliance with the law is clothed with the ex-clusive right
of possession and enjoyment, the locator of a mining
claim is given a higher estate than is g-iven the settler or
locator under any other land laws. And if the government after a valid mining location has been made could
deprive the locator of his rights, his right of possession
certainly would not be "exclusive." And the result is,
as Mr. Lindley says in the Third Edition of his work,
Section 542 at page 1209: "that the government itself
cannot deprive the locator of rights accrued under the
mining laws has we think been fully demonstrated."
We remark in passing and parenthetically that if the
contention of the defendants can prevail then the court
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would permit these defendants to do something which the
g'overnment of the United States itself could not do.
\Yith reference to the character of the estate held by
a mining locator, we might fill a volume with quotations
from the decided cases, but we assume that Mr. Lindley's
epitome found in Section 539 of his Third Edition will
suffice; .and it appears therefrom thnt the character of
the estate held by the locator (not by virtue of any patent
but prior to the issuance of patent and after discovery) is
by virtue of the Act of Congress itself, which in and of
itself is a muniment of title of highest dignity and solemnity and has been described and defined as follows:
It is property in the highest sense of that term which
may be bought, sold and conveyed and will pass by deseent.
It is vendible, inheritable and taxable.
It is a legal estatE' ·of freehold.
It has the effect of a grant of the right of present and
exclusive possession of the lands located.

It is in its nature real estate. Although the locator
may obtain a patent, his patent adds but little to his Sf'curity.
The owner of a location is entitled to the exclusive
possession and enjoyment against everyone, including the
United States itself.
The area becomes segregated from the public domain
and becomes the property of the locator.
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The general government itself cannot abridge the
rights of the miner. His rights have become vested and
the government may not destroy those rights.
And finally at the top of page 1204 of said Section
539, the author says:
''The doctrine hereinbefore enunciated has
never been seriously questioned. It has been reiterated in many cases in both the state and federal
courts.''

We do not anticipate that what we have said immediately above will be challenged by counsel for the respondents. But they have contended that there must be
some point in time when the character of land must be
finally determined; and, for the interests of all concerned,
there can be no better point to determine that question
than at the time of issuing the patent; that a patent upon
its face should either grant or not grant and that it must
be seen from a construction of the language of the patent
itself whether anything is granted or not and if anything
be granted what it is; that there is no authority to issue
a patent which in effect only says: If the lands herein
described 1hereafter turn out to be agricultural land then
I grant them, but if they turn out to be mineral land, then
I do not grant them; that such a patent would be so uncertain that it would be impossible to determine from the
face of the patent whether anything is granted or not.
And so counsel argued and cited to the trial court decisions from various courts, from the Supreme Court
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the United States down to the Supreme Court of the
then Territory of Utah, to the effect that a patent of the
United States is not subject to collateral attack but is in
and of itself conclusive (at least in actions at law) of all
matters of fact necessary to its issue.
As to t1hat, the following three propositions may be
deduced from the decided cases:
1. A patent is conclusive against eollateral attack
between rival claimants when a patentee has a vested
right in the property in question by virtue of his patent,
and his adversary seeking to assail the patent had no
vested right at the time of patent.

2. A patent is conclusive against collateral attack
between rival claimants when eaeh had a elaim to the
property in question, known and recognized by the law,
before the patent issued and the patent issued only after
a hearing wherein each claimant had his day in court and
opportunity to establish his alleged claim.
3. ~Where a property rig1ht has vested in one person,
prior to the issuance of a patent to another person, and
no provision is made by the laws for a hearing wherein
the merits of the respective claims might be determined,
if the Land Office nevertheless assumes to issue patent,
it in so doing is acting outside its jurisdiction and the
patent is void and there is no room for invoking tlhe doctrine that the patent is conclusive against collateral attrack.
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The case of Ferry v. Street, 4; Utah 521, is a typical
case falling within the first proposition, supra.
In the Ferry case the grantee of the patentee brought
ejectment against the defendant and proved the issuance
of patent and conveyance from the patentee to the plaintiff. The defendant admitted his ouster but set up no
recognized rig·ht to the land in himself. Apparently the
defendant relied on the maxim that the plaintiff in ejectment must prevail on the strength of his own title and
not on the weakness of lhis adversary's title. It appeared
that the defendant was nothing but a ''squatter'' and had
theretofore initiated no claim to the land under any known
or recognized procedure; nevertheless the defendant
claimed that the patent had wrongfully issued to the
plaintiff's predeces~ors and that therefore the plaintiff
must fail. The defendant asserted that the patent ought
not to have issued because as a matter of fact the land
involved was mineral land at the time the patent issued.
But the court said in effect that that contention, if it ever
could be made, could arise only in a controversy between
the patentee and the government or some real party in
interest prior to tihe issuance of patent; that Congress
had delegated to the Land Department jurisdiction to determine as between the applicant for a patent and the
government all facts necessary to be determinerl hefore
issuance of patent, including the question whether or not
the land in controversy was mineral or not mineral; that
in that controversy, if any existed, the defendant had no
concern whatever; that he was an outsider and had done
nothing to establish any right in the property in any way
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which the law recognized. And se> the court announced
the doctrine that inasmuch .as the only parties in interest
/had .had th~ir rights determined before a competent tribunal resulting in the issuance of patent, that the patent
was conclusive as between the real parties in interest
and l110 'outsider could be heard to assert that that adjudication w.as wrong.
And to the same effeet, in St. Louis Smelting & Refining Company v. Green, 13 Ped. 208, the ~ourt quotes
the 'Supreme C-ourt of the United States as follows~
"It does not lie in the moutlh of a stranger to
the title to -coni-plain of the act of the government
with respect to it. If the ,government ~s dissatisned, it .can, ~n its own account, authorize ;proceedings to va.cate the :patent or limit its operation.''

And again in Horsky v. Moran, 53 Pac. 1064, the Supreme Court of Montana said:
''By his answer he shows that he has long
since disconnected himself from the United Stntes
government, stands in no privity with it, and possesses no claim, legal or equitable, to the lotE. which
plaintiff has openly, notoriously and continuously
oeeupi<ed for over 20 years. Defendant is without
any title or clhain of title at all. He is in the attitude of an intruder, MJ.d it does not lie in his mouth
to be he:ard to assail the plaintiff's position. Bohall v, Dilla, 114 U. S. 50, 5 Su.p. C~ 182;'·'

As to the second proposition, supra, the mining laws
provide for the so-called adverse suit between rival mineral claimants. An applicant for a mineral patt>nt must
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issue notice to the entire world of his claim and application for patent. Thereupon any other mineral claimant
may object and advance his claims to the territory in
question and have the merits finally determined in a court
of competent jurisdiction. Of course, th·~ questions involved are res adjudicata after a trial or, if a rival claimant fails to adverse when given opportunity, he may not
afterwards challenge the patent. However, it should be
always borne in mind that there is no provision for an
adverse suit except as between rival mineral claimants.

"717. Section 2305 of the Revised Statutes
only contemplates adverse proceedings as between
rival mineral claimants to the land, and does not
!have in view a settlement of the character of the
land as between mineral and agricultural claimants."
Lindley on Mines, 3rd Ed., p. 1755.

The case at bar falls under the third proposition, supra, and the reason for it is well stated by J-udge Sanborn in Uinta Tunnel Min. & Transp. Co. v. Creede &
Cripple Creek Min. & Mill. Co., 119 Fed. 164, 167:
''A judgment is binding upon the parties to
the proceeding in which it is rendered and upon
their privies. The parties to the judgments of
tlhe land department by which it allowed the entries
of the lode claims in the case of the gold mining
company were the United States and the owners
of those claims. No other parties had or claimed
any interest in the land at the time those entries
were made. The judg1nents and the patents ac-
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cordingly bound and estopped these parties and
their subsequent assignees. They estopped all
parties who initiated claims upon or interests in
the lands under either of the parties to the proceeding subsequent to the judgments of the land
department. The claimant of tlhe tunnel site in
that case initiated its claim under the United
States one of the parties to that proceeding subsequent to the judgments. It was therefore a privy
of the United States, and was estopped by the
judgments of the land department from proving
that no discoveries had been made upon the lode
claims before these judgments were rendered.
Thris is not the -case in the action before us.
The judgments of the land department allowing
the entries were rendered on August 5, 1892. At
that time there were three parties interested in
the land, the lode claimants, the United States and
the claimant of the tunnel site. Two of these parties, the lode claimants and the United States,
were parties to the proceedings, and were estopped by the judgments and the patents. One of
them was not a party to any of these proceedings,
to the judgments, or to the patents, and~ upon
familiar principles was neitlher bound by them 110r
estopped by them from presenting and proving according to the established rules of evidence in
trials under the common law the fact that no discoveries had been made on the lode claims before
the location of its tunnel site, the fact essential
to the validity of its claim upon and interest in
the land."
By t~1e following decisions the appellants' contention that the patent issued on the l\fcGuire Placer gives
title paramount to the agricultural patent is full.'r sustained.
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'' * "" "' A valid location of a quartz lode
mining claim on the public mineral lands of the
United States is a grant from the government to
the locator thereof, and carries with it the right,
by a compliance witlh the law, of obtaining a full
and complete title to all the lands included withinthe boundaries of the claim, which by the location
are withdrawn from sale or pre-emption; and the
patent, when issued, relates back to the location,
and is not a distinct grant, but the consummation
of the grant which had its inception in the location ,of the claim."
-Butte City Smokehouse Lode Cases, 6
Mont. 397, 401, 12 Pac. 858.
"If then, the location of a mining claim has
the effect of a grant by the United States to the:
locator of the right to the present and exclusive
possession of the ground located, it foHows that
there could not be a like grant of the same property, to any other person. There would be no
room for a further grant; for the government
would have nothing further to convey. After such
a grant, which also carries witih it the right to
purchase the abso!lute title, the land described
within the grant ceases to be public land, and the
pre-emption laws, and laws providing for the sale
and purchase of the public domain, have no application to it 'Or effect upon it. It is just as much
wi1fudrawn from the public domain as the fee is by
a valid grant from the United States under authority, or the possession by a valid and subsisting homestead or pre-emption entry. It is already
sold, and becomes private property, which may be:
disposed of at the will of the owner. And so land
thus so:ld and disposed of is not affected one way
or another by the subsequent acts of congress pro-
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viding for the entry of townsites upon the public
lands. The application and entry for (non-mineral lands) is only authorized on the public lands;
and after the lands have been granted and sold,
AS IN THE CASE OF A VALID MINING LOCArL'ION AND CLAIM, the entry of a (non-mineral claimant) does not affect such claim though
Rituate within the boundaries of the same. The
reason is that the mining claim and ground has
already been granted and sold and has thereby
c·eascd to be a portion of the public lands for
which only the (non-mineral) entry could be
1nade. f.' * * ''
-Silver Bow M. & Nl. Co. v. Clark, 5 Mont.
378, 415; 5 Pac. 570.
''A valid !oration is equivalent to a contract
of purchase. The right to occupy and purchase
means the right to acquire a full title. The mineral lands are declared open to occupation and
purchase. Th(c~ location, together with the necessary work, is the purchase, and the patent is the
evidence of the title so acquired. The location,
therefore, has the effect of a grant from the government to the locator; and this grant cannot be
defeated or abridged by an unauthorized exception contained in the patent, for the patent must
always be in accordance with and the consummation of the grant evidenced by a valid location.
-Talbot v. King, 6 Mont. 76, 9 Pac. 434.

Commcn~1g on th~~ foregoing statements of the law,
the Supreme Court of the Unitt~d S.tatcs has the following to Ray:
''In the several cases to which we have been
refnrrc>d in the fifth and sixth Montana Reports
(:\filling Co. v. Olark, 5 Mont. 378, 5 Pac. Rep. 570;
Talbott v. King, 6 Mont. 76, 9 Pac. Rep. 434; Butte>

City Smokehouse Lode Cases, 6 Mont. 397,.12 Pac.
Rep. 858), which involved contests between parties claiming under mining patents and others
claiming under town-site patents, and in which
very able and learned opinions were given by tlte
Supreme Court of the territory of Montana, t~he
mining claims patented had been located and the
rights of the mining claimant had thus attached
before the town-site patent was issued. The patent which subsequently followed was a mere perfection of the right orit,rinated by the location, and
to which it took effect by re lation. It was held,
in accordance with this opinion, that the prior
mining location was not affected by the townsite
entry."
Davis v. "Wiebold, 139 U.S. 507, 11 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 628, 636.
1

If an_v doubt can be entertained that the foregoing

authorities must be limited in application to controversies between a mineral claimant and a elaimant under a
townsite entry any such doubt must be removed by th()
holding of the Supreme Court in the case of Noyes v.
Mantle, 127 U. S. 348, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132. In that ease
the controversy "\Vas brtween a prior lode location a11d a
subsequent placer patent and the Supreme Court says, rt>ferring to the prior lode location:
"There is no pretense in this case that the
original locators did not eomply with all the requirements of the law in making the location of
the Pay Streak lode mining claim or that the claim
was ever abandoned or forfeited. They were the
discoverers of the claim. They marked its boundaries by stakes, so that they could be readily
traced. They posted the required notice~ which
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was duly recorded in compliance wjth the regulations of the district. They had thns done all that
was necessary under the la>v for the acquisition of
an exc1lusive right to the possession and enjoyment
of the ground. T,he claim was thenceforth their
property. They needed only a patent of the United
States to render their title perfect, and that they
could obtain at any time upon proof of what they
had done in locating the claim, and of :subsequent
expenditures to a specified amount in developing
it. Until the patent issued, the government held
the title in trust for the locators or tl.eir vendees.
The ground itself 1oas not afterwards open to sale.
The location having become completed in April,
1878, antedates by some months the application of
the defendant for a patent for his placer claim.''
''As said in Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279,
283: 'A mining claim perfected under the law is
property in the highest sense of that term, which
may be bought, sold, and eonveyed, and will pass
by descent.' It is not, therefore, subject to the
disposal of the government."
And then after defining a lode "known to exist" t\O
far as a placer patent is concerned, the court condudes
its opinion with the following language:
"At any rate, as already stated, it could not
convey property which had already passed to others. A patent of the government cannot, any
more H1an a deed of an individual, transfer what
the grantor does not possess.''

If the foregoing is the law (and under the authorities
there would seem to be no doubt about it) when only a
mining location-not yet gone to patent-is involved ho""\1'
much stronger is the case in behalf of the McGuire Placer
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which did in fact g·o to patent. In that respect the Smoln·house Lode Cases and tlJe case of Davis v. Wiebold,
supra, announce the rule :
''In the case of Sparks v. Pierce, 115 U. S.
412, S. C. 6 Sup. Ct. 'Rep. 102, it is said that a patant to a mineral claim is itself evidence that all
the requirements of the law for its sale have been
complied with.
And so the Smokehouse patent was itself evidence that, in the discovery, the location of the
claim, and in all proceedings up to the issuance of
the patent, the law had been complied with. The
Smokehouse location was known to exist before the
town-site entry. This patent related hack to the
location in 1875, and fixes the mineral character
of the claim at that time, and at all subsequent
times, up to the date of the issuance of the patent in 1881. It was, therefore a valid mining
claim and possession in 1877, when the townsite
patent was issued, and necessarily excepted
therefrom.''

II.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.

For the court's convenience, we tabulate the sequence
of the alleged occupancy :
Maxwell until May 26, 1899.
Dr. Straup, May 26, 1899 to May 8, 1901.
Charles McCann, May 8, 1901, to Octobrr 5,

1904.
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Dr. Castleman, October 5, 1904, to March 30,
1907.
Dr. C. N. Ray, March 30, 1907, to June 30,
1913.
Dr. Davison H. Ray and Dr. O'Brien, June
30, 1913, to April19, 1917.
Dr. Davison H. Ray, April 19, 1917, to June
26, 1920.
Elizabeth K. Ray, June 26, 1920, to November 21, 1922.
Dr. Frazier, November 21, 1922, to September 20, 1924.
Utah Copper Company, September 20, 1924,
to date.
It appears from the only testimony offered on the
subject that Maxwell went into possession under permission from John McGuire, one of the owners of the mining claim (Abs. 50, 'rrans. 81), and from time to time in
the succeeding years recognized the paramount title. He
approached Gibbons at least twice in e:ff:ort to acquire
title. (Abs. 49, Trans. 77.) In the case of Central Pac.
Ry. Co. vs. Tarpey, 51 Utah 107-121, the following ru1e
was approved and adopted:

''The possession of one who recognizes or admits title in another either by declaration or conduct, is not adverse to the title of such other until
such occupant has changed the character of his
possession either by express declaration or by
the exercise of actual ownership inconsistent with
a suboruina te character."
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Again D.r. Straup was never in actual posse:ssion of
the demanded premises adversely or otherwise. The witness BomregaiPd so testified (.Abs. 39, Trans. 25), and so
did Dr. Straup himself at the commencement :of his crossexamination. (.Abs. 42, Trans. 36.)
The period -of adverse possession cannot therefore
eGmmenre prrio·r to May 8, 1.901, when Dr. Straup sold to
McCann. Furthermore the proof as to payment of taxes
on any land commences with the year 1896. In 1895 taxes
were assessed against "1 frame house" .and no more. \Ve
mention the circumstance, but do not dwell upon it, that
for the years 1896-1899 (defendants' Exhibits 43-40, Ahs.
31), the property .assessed was merely described as '' 50x
100 feet Bingham.'' It was announced in Fare£ v. Urban,
46 Utah 609, that ·where both parties _produce tax receipts
and the description is vague in the receipts produced by
the adverse claimant, he must fail.

It is oonoeded by the resp.ondents that their proof
fails entirely to show payment of any taxes whatsoever
for the year 1902. 'rhe puoof does show that taxes assest>ed f@lr :the year 1920 were not paid when due, but sale
was made tD the county. The fact that redemption was
made does not satisfy the statute.
''But, though the redemption had been effected while :he was still ;in posseSBion claiming
title, it wou1d not have .bwn a -compliance with
tthe -law. If there is anything of "benefit to the
i!tate contemplated by this anomalous law, it is
.that it will have a tendency to induce people to
pay their taxeR, ·and not compel the state to take
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the title slilbjeet to redemption. If it is an element in the adverse possession .Wnding to show
good faith, .certainly during those years in which
the taxes have not been paid the possession lacl{!S
an essential element required in the statute. During aU the y-ears in which the 'delinquency was a~
lowed, the tr:u1e owner might forbear suit because
of his knowledge that the person in possession had
not paid taxes, thereby indicating that he was not
holding advers~ly.''
M.eDona,ld v. McCoy, 121 Cal. 55, 53 Pa·c.
421,426.
It is a matter ·of commc,m knowledge that any
-str.ang€r to the title, not necessarily the owner or an agent
foT the owner of pToperty, can go to the County Treasurer and pay the taxes on any piece of property he cares
to designate and the treas.urer will take his money and
give him -a receipt. {)If ;Course, if a person has a receipt
in his possession there is a P'resumption that he paid thf:
taxes evidenced thereby. But the defendants' proof of
payment of taxes in this case is not that. The defendants
introduced nothing but duplicate receipt's obtained from
the treasurer a week or so before the trial. Such duplicate receipts are doubtless evidence that the property described therein was atlseS'sed to the owner or claimant
named therein. They a:re doubtless eviclenee that the
taxes desoribed therein were in fact paid by somebody.
But obviously th€-y ·:a.re not eVidence of payment by any
particular person.
''As to Payment of Taxes. Where payment
of taxes is made an element of adverse possession
there is no presumption that the claimant has paid
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them but he must show this fact; nor does any
presumption of payment arise from the fact that
the taxes were assessed to the claimant and no
default in payment was shown.''
2 Corpus Juris, Title "Adverse Possession,'' Section 596.
"If any taxes were 'levied and assessed'
(such are the words of the statute) * ,. * the
defendant must show that he or his grantors paid
them to establish his adverse possession. It is immaterial to whom they were assessed. Whether
assessed to him or to some other person, if he does
not show that he or his grantors have paid them,
he cannot make out his adverse possession. It will
not be enough for defendant to prove that he has
paid aU the taxes levied and assessed on the land
owned by him in the county where the land in suit
is situated; for the defense of the statute of limitations admits that he does not ovvn the land unless
by reason of his adverse possession, and the adverse possess~on is to be made out by this showing.''

Ross v. Evans, 4 Pac. 443 (Cal. 1884).
The only two witnesses produced by the defendants
vvho testified to the payment of taxes during any Sf~ven
year period of occupancy were Dr. Castleman and Dr.
C. N. Ray. The seven-year period on which the deferdants can rely must therefore be between October 5, 1904,
and June 30, 1913. It is true that on direct examniation
Dr. Castleman testified that he had paid the taxes d11ring his occupancy, but we quote from his cross examination:
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"Q. You testified in answer to Mr. Parsons,
I believe, that you paid taxes on this lot which we
designate as Lot 10, Block 41
A. I believe I did, yes.
Q. Have you any recollection, of doing it
Doctor~

A. No distinct recol1lection such as writing
out a check or receiving a tax notice and remitting the money, no. I have no such reeollection
as that.
Q. Have you any definite recollection of receiving any tax notices~
A. No, I cannot picture any tax notice.''

Dr. Ray's testimony was substantially to the same
effect.
But it is not necessary to resolve a conflict in the tes·
timony of these witnesses because on this branch of the
case it can be determined on admitted facts as a matter
of law. It must be admitted that Lot 10, Block 4 of
'Wilkes Survey of Bingham is set within the exterior linE'~
of the McGuire & Company Placer. And by the same
token when taxes are aRsessed against said Lot 10, Block
4, and are also assessed against the placer ground, in so
far as one area is embraced within the other. that same
area has necessarily been taxed twice-once under the lot
and block description and again under the name of the
mining claim.
The facts in the case come squarely within the rule
announced by the Supreme Court in the case of Ri••
Grande Vv estern Railway Company v. Salt Lake Investment Company, 35 Utah 528, 101 Pac. 586, where Judgr
Frick says:
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"If the County Assessor had assessed Lot 8
by one de:,;cription to appellant as claimant, and
by another, or by the same description to respondent as owner, it would then be a case of assessing
the same property to two claimants, either one of
whom could have paid the taxes. Under such circumstances, the question would arise as to which
one of the claimants, in contemplation of law, had
pai.d the taxes. The authorities, under such circumstances, are to the effect that the one who
pays first is to be deemed as having paid the taxes
for the purpose of acquiring title by adverse possession.''

'rhe evidenee as to the dates of payments of taX('S
assessed against Lot 10, Block 4, and the l'deGuire & Company Placer is as follows:
Lot 10, Block 4
McGuire & Company
Plat" A", Bingham
Placer Claim.
Taxes for Year
Date Paid
Date Paid
1904
Nov. 12, 1904
Nov. 4, 1904.
1905
Nov. 14, 1905
Oct. 18, 1905.
1906
Nov. 14,1906
Oct. 23, 1906.
Nov. 14,1907
1907
Nov. 9, 1907.
1908
Oct. 21, 1908
Sept. 22, 1908.
1909
Nov. 3, 1909
Nov. 6, 1909.
1910
Oct. 22, 1910
Nov. 8, 1910.
1911
Nov. 8, 1911
Oct. 23, 1911
1912
Oct. 17, 1912
Nov. 1, 1912.
Nov. 1, 1913
1913
Nov. 10, 1913.
1914
Nov. 5, 1914
Nov. 2, 1914.
1915
Oct. 19, 1915
Oct. 14, 1915.
Nov. 17, 1916
1916
Nov. 20, 1916.
1917
Sept. 28, 1917
Nov. 6, 1917.
1918
Sept. 16, 1918
Oct. 29, 1918.
1919
Oct. 10, 1919
Sept. 24, 1919.
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It is of eourse perfectly evident from the foreg-oingtabulation that it is impossible for the defendants to show
any consecutive seven years wherein taxes on Lot 10~
Block 4, were paid before taxes for the same years were
paid on the McGuire & Company Placer. So the defenHe
of adverse possession must be resolved against the defendants.
It w!ll be remembered that in announcing its decisi0n
the trial court said:
"If the question in

th~s

case involved only the
property rights acquired under the patents, the
<'Ourt might be inclined to the opinion maintained
by the plaintiffs, that is, that the placer patent related back to the original location and established
priority, but the adverse possession on the part of
the defendants is so clearly estabJished that the
case must be determined on that question.
Two cases have a1lready been tried and a ppealed to the Supreme Court and settled by that
tribunal on this identical question and these have
been cited in defendants' brief and are binding on
this court.''
rrhe hvo cases referred to were cited to the trial comt
by the respondents with nothing more than the following
observation:
"A citation of authority would not seem necessary upon this phase of the ease and we content
ourselves with a reference merely to the decisions'
of the Supreme Court of Utah in the following
cases:
Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85,
142 Pac. 1119;

Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165,
152 Pac. 178.
The foregoing cases are rules of property in
this jurisdiction upon which the defendants had a
right to rely in their several purchases of the
premises herein invO'lved.''
In view of the answer of the <lefendantb herein and
in view of their motion for non-suit, not to mention numerom; objeetions made during the course of the trial
and the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgme11t,
it is not apparent why the doctrine of th~~ Chandler case
applif::s to the issue..; in this case at all.
The doctrine of the Chaudler case is stated by .Justice JTriek iu the ]<Jekman case as follows:
"It is accordingly held in that case that, under the statute, if a person is in actual and adverse possession of the surface ground of a mining claim for the poriml of time required by our
statute, and has, during that time, improved the
·surface under a claim of right, such person may be
assessed with such surface area and the improvements thereon, and that he may pay the taxes so
assessed, and such payment will be sufficient to
<>ntitle him to make a claim of adverse possession
to such surface ground, together with the improvements thereon, as against the owner of the mining
claim, although the latter may also have paid the
taxes on the mining claim as such and in accordanee with the fixed statutory valuation aforesaid,
and may claim all the minerals beneath the surfaee. ''
In the record mad<~ by the defendants in the present
case, from one end of it to the other-from th<> answer of
the defendants to the judgment which they persuaded tlw
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trial court to sign and file-no mention whatever is made
of a claim to the surface of a mining claim. In their
answer they claim title in fee simple absolute to the entire domain. In their motion for non-snit they insisted
that the plaintiffs had failed to make a ease because plaintiffs' title was derived from the mineral patent whereas
the defendants' title was derived from the agricultural
patent and the latter they claimed gave a better title from
original source. The findings and conclusions are to the
same effect. In short, the judgment entered in this ease
is intended to be and unless reversed will be res adjudicata in favor of the defendants both as to the surface
g;round and the subsurface ground, and that in face of
the proof that the appellants paid all taxes levied and assessed against the McGuire & Company Placer. \Ve cannot believe that any such judgment can be permitted to
stand except on the theory that the agricultural patent
under which the respondents' elaim is a source of title
paramount and superior to the title acquired under the
mineral patent.
If such a theory is pennitted to prevail, then of
course the question of adverse possession is out of the
case. If such a theory cannot be sustained then the judg·ment of the trial court awards to the respondents, under
their plea of adverse possession, certain land admittedly
assessed for taxation and on which the appellants paid
taxes, at all material times, prior to the payment of taxes
thereon by the respondents.
The rule announced in the ease of Rio Grande \Vestem Raihvay Company Y. Salt Lake Investment Company,
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35 Utah 528, ought to control the uecision of the present
case. So far as adverse possession is concerned, this case
is nothing more than one where land was assessed to two
claimants, under different descriptions, and appellants
paid taxes assessed to the appellants before the respondents paid taxes assessed to the respondents.
It may be conceded that the facts in the Chandler
case are sui generis. Nevertheless, the decis~on is bottomed upon elementary and long-established principles
and is entirely sound.
rrhe doctrine of Severance antedates the De0laration
of Independence and is well established.
"Although the owner of the surface is prima
facie the owner of the minerals beneath the surface, and a general conveyance of the land will
carry the minerals, it is consistent with the nature
and adaptation of mineral property that different persons should own the surface and the underlying minerals, and so the owner of land containing minerals may segregate one from the
other, by a conveyance or instrument in writing,
so that there is a complete severance of title and
separate estates are created."
27 Cyc. 681.
And the Supreme Court of California has said:
''Such an absolute estate in an unde11lying
stratum may he created and the estate of the owner
of the overlying land and of the owner of the subterranean stratum will be as distinct and separate as is the ownership of respective owners of
two adjoining tracts of land. For purposes of
separate ownership, land may be divided horizontally as ,,·ell as superficially and vertically."
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Graeiosa Orl Company v. Santa Barbara
County, 99 Pac. 483.
On page 687 of the same Volume of Cyc. the text
reads as follows:
''After the mineral is conveyed a part from
the land, or vice versa, two separate estates exist,
each of which is distinct; the surface and the mineral right are then held by separate and distinct
titles in severalty, and each is a freehold estate
of inheritance separate from and independent of
the other. Each estate may be conveyed by deed
in the same manner as other real estate is conveyed, may be devised by will, may pass by inheritance, and is subject to taxation."
Patent from the United States to the owners of a
mining location vestB in the patentee title to the surface
ground as well as to the minerals beneath.
Original Consol. Mining Co. v. Abbott, 167
Fed. 681.
By the force and effc~ct of patent it,self, no severance
of the claimed premises into a surface estate and a subsurface estate results, although the character of mining
ground is such as to permit of such severance. The conventional morle of effecting a severance is of course by
deed, whereby the ovvner of tlw entire proprietorship conveys the surfaee and n~serves the mmPrals with right to mme and extract the same
or vice versa. But due process of law is satisfied if severance is accomplished by adverse possession ·of the surface or of the minerals beneath; also
by forfeiture for non-payment of taxes separately assessed against th(' surface estate or against the subsur-

38
face estate. Ho1vever, until severance there is only one
e,state, and adverse possession of the surface draws with
it the right to claim the subsurface. And in like manner
a tax lPvied against the patented premises impresses its
lien on both the surface and the subsurface as one C'state
and a tax deed convey's to the purehaser at tax sale the
entire proprietorship as one estate.
To say that mineral lands can, in law and from their
very characteristics, be divided into two estates, one a
surface estate of free-hold and the other a free-hold estate in the subsurface minerals, is not to say that there
are necessarily two such esta t<•s in every parcel of mineral ground. On the contrary the two estates come into
being only after severance has in some manner been
made. Prior to severance mineral Janel is precisely the
same as any other land.
• '-Where theTe is no severance of the surface
estate from the underlying mineral estate the ordinary rules of adverse possession of real estate
apply, and the rule is that possession of the
surface of mineral land is possession of all the
underlying minerals. An adverse entry or possession of the surface extends downward and draws
to it title to all the underlying minerals.
"Until severance takes place" " " the
owner's title rPaehes from the center to the sure
face, and from the surface to the heavens; and
with a grant of the land or an acquisition of title
by an adverse holding the entire estate of the former owner passes.
''The decisions. are unanimous in holding that
-where the title to the mineral right has been severed from the title to the surface, possession of
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the surface by its owne-r is not adverse to the owner of the mineral below it. The mineral owner
does not lose his possession by any length of nonuser, and the surface owner cannot acquire title
to the minerals by adverse possession based on his
exclusive and continued occupancy of the surface
alone.''
13 A. L. R. Note at pages 372, 375.
While the authorities are agreed that prior to severance, possesgion of the Hurfane iH possesHion of the minerals, and thus adverse possession of the surface gives
the adverse claimant the minerals as well, they are also
agreed that after severance, two estates being then created, possession ·of thP surfare is not possession of tlw
minerals, and adverse possession of one estate does not
Pntitle the claimant to the other. At the same time we
fmd the text-writers announcing the rule that severance
lllay be aecomplished hy adverse pnssession and that is
doubtless true. But unless the case ·of Utah Copper Company v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, so decides, we assert, after
careful research, that there is no case in the reports
where adverse claim to the surface effected that result.
To the contrary every case cited in support of the doc-trine that severance can be effected by adverse possession ·shows that the adverse possession therein was of
the minerals. vVhy that should be is apparent. It is
not likely that an adverse claimant would refuse t·o take
all that his proof entitled him to demand. Since his adYerse possession of the ·surface entitles a claimant to
both the surface and the minerals, it is not surprising to
find in the decided cases no party to the litigation un-
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willing to take all the law gives him, and yet one can
conceive that the contrary might be the case and no
principle of law forbids it. However, there is a fundamental element of adverse possession that the possession of the claimant in order to be adverse should be
such as to advise the owner of the claimant'.s claim. Another essential is that the claimant must show payment
by himself of taxes levied and assessed against the land
claimed. The adverse possession may be such as to ad'Vise the o\vner of the adverse claim, and yet, under the
law, if the claimant does not pay all taxes assessed
against the premises, the mvner may rest secure in his
legal title, as,sured by the law that he can assert it and
prevail at any time.
The rule seems to he established that when one g'oes
into possession of mineral ground under a deed purporting to convey to him the entire proprietorship, from the
surface to the center of the earth, that that is his claim
and, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, that
is the notice given to the record owner of the extent of
the adverse claim.
''In considering the question Whether Hylton ''s entry and possession was adversary and hostile, the familiar principle must be borne in mind
that when one enters upon land he is presumed to
enter under the title which his deed purports upon
its face to convey, both as to the boundary or extent of the land and the nature of his title. * * *
From the first, he is presumed, indeed he is proved,
to have claimed under his deed, and there is nothing to show that he or those who claim under him
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ever acknowledged that the title to the land was
anything other than as it appeared upon the face
of his deed. *, * * The evidence clearly shows
that Hylton was in the exclusive possession of the
land from the year 1877, when he entered under
the conveyance of that date, claiming title to the
whole tract in fee, until the institution of this suit,
a period of thirty years or more. He paid taxes
on it throughout these years as the fee simple
owner; resided upon it the greater portion of the
time; mined coal for his domestic purposes and
small quantities for sale. \Vhether his coal operations during that period would have been sufficieirt to have given him title to the coal if the mineral interest had been severed from the surface
need not be considered, since, as we have seen
there was no such severance; but unquestionably
his acts of adversary possession were sufficient
to creat(~ in him a complete title to the land in fee,
mineral as well as surface, for his deed covered
both.''
Virginia C. & I. Co. v. Hylton, 79 S. E. 337.
''Everything in this ease indicates that Richl!lond took possesHion under his deed as an adversary claimant, under a claim of title to the whole
tract of 96 acres in fee. * * * Admittedly in
possession of the surface from February 21, 1891,
Richmond is presumed to have entered, in the absence of anything to the contrary (and there is
nothing to the contrary) under a claim of title to
the \Vhole fee. There is nothing to show that he,
or those who claimed under him, ever acknowledged that his title to the land was other than it
appeared upon the face of his deed. Indeed Richmond's conduct throughout indicated a purpose to
claim and exen·ise all the rights that a deed pur-
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porting to convey the fee in the whole tract, accompanied by possession and control of the area
within his boundaries would afford. * * * Thjs
court is of opinion upon the law and the facts of
this case, that Richmond's entry upon the 96-acre
tract was adversary and hostile, with full intent
to claim and exercise against all parties all the
rights of an owner in fee with respect to the sur-~
face and subsurface of the land purchased from
Chisenhall. vV e are further of the opinion that
he entered upon this 1and under the title that his
deed purported to convey, both as to the boundary
and extent of his land and the nature of his title,
and that neither he or those claiming under him
have ever acknowledged that the title to the land
was anything other than it appeared upon the face
of the deed, but have continued to hold the entire
tract adversely. This adverse holding by Richmond continued for a far greater length of time
than was necessary under the statute to establish
a complete title to the land in fee, both a s to the
surface and the minerals, for his deed covered
both.''
1

1

Virginia C. & I. Go. v. Richmond, 104 S. E.
805.
On the other hand it is obvious that when a claimant
takes posset~sion of the minerals, as distinguished from
the surface, his po·sscssion, if sufficient to be termed
"adverse," must in the n?ry nature of things fully inform
the owner of his claim.
If an advPn~e claimant drives a tunnel or siiJks a
shaft and extraets ·ores, anyone can see it, and the owner
is bound to take notice of suC'h activities. As appears
from tlw decided cases, cited in the exhaustive note in
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13 A. L. R., pages 372-383, adverse possession of the subsurface estate has been frequently claimed and sustained.
The thoroughness of the editorial staff of the Lawyers'
Co-op, when it undertakes to collect the authorities into a
note on a chosen subject is, we believe, conceded by the
profession today. Is it not noteworthy, that when dealing with the subject of adverse possession of surface and
subsurface estates there is no group of case's dealing with
adverse possession of the surface alone albeit there is a
large group dealing with adverse possession of the subsurface estate.
And so it is safe to say that the facts in the Chandler
case are unique.

The facts in that case ·were stipulated

between the parties and it was expressly .agreed that the
adverse claimant went into possession of the surface only,
made claim to the surface only and maintained adverse
possession of the surface only, and expressly disclaimed
any interest in the minerals or subsurface estate.
The Chandler Case was decided in 1914. A year
later the case of Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165,
came on for decision by the Supreme Court, and it has
been urged that the Eckman Case holds, that if the proof
sho·ws that the mining claim was assessed to its owner as
so many acres of ground at the price per acre paid to the
government therefor and further shows that the surface
had an independent value and use then the doctrine of
the Chandler Case applies. Our ans\ver to that is that
the proof in the Eckman Case, in that respect, was pre-
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cisely the same as the proof in the case at bar, and nevertheless and notwithstanding the proof was held insufficient to sustain the claim of adverse possession.
vVe quote from the judgment roll in the Eckman Case
as it was filed in the Supreme Court:
''MR. PARSONS: vVe offer in evidence
plaintiff's exhibits C, D, E, F, G, H and I, being
the tax receipts upon the Mirror Lode Mining
Claim for the years 1903, to 1910, inclusive.''
Each and all of said exhibits read the same ex-'
cept rus to the amount of the tax for the several
years. Thus:
''Property assessed to L. M. Byers.
Description :-Mirror Mining Claim No.
2890~
No. of Acres, 18.73. West Mountain.
Assessed value :'-$95.00. ''
Total tax:
1903-$1.86.
1904- 2.43.
1905- 2.08.
1906- Sold for taxes.
1907- Sold for taxes.
1908- 2.27.
1909- 2.56.
1910- 2.56.
The rebuttal argument is that the evidence was t,o
be sure just as quoted, but the Eckman Case was reversed
it is claimed because the trial court made no finding that
the Mirror lode mining e]ajm had been assessed merely
at $5.00 per acre.
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At every term of the Supreme Court during the past
twenty years, at least once and often many times, the
court has announced the rule, that by positive. statutory
enactment it must disregard any error which does not
affect the substantial rights of the parties.. Accordingly
it was held in Snyder v. Allen, 51 Utah 291, that while
it was error for the trial court to fail to make a. certain
finding, yet when the evidence sho'\ved that no finding
would have been permissible other than in support of the
jndpmmt, the judgment could not be reversed. Ag;ain in
Sheppick v. Sheppick. 44 Utah 131, the court said:
".While the court perhaps should have made
a finding upon the issue of adverse possession, yet,
in view that no finding except one adverse to the
defendant's contention was permis,sible under all
the evidence, the error, if any was committed, was
immaterial, and hence without prejudice.''
It is difficult for us to believe that the Supreme
Court reversed the Eckman Case because the trial court
failed to find that the Mirror Lode was assessed merely
at $3.00 per acre, when in the reeord then before it the
tax receipts, introduced in evidence, showed precisely
what was the fact of the matter and no other finding
\nmld have been permissible.
On the contrary, it seems clear both from the form
and substance of the opinion that it was the fact that it
was impossible to ascertain either from the pleadings,
the proof or the findings whether Eckman claimed the
surface only or the entire domain that caused the reversal. Expressly for that reason the opinion quotes
Eckman's counter-claim and the court's findings in full.

In terms Eckman claimed by his counter-claim fee simple
title. At the same time he traced his title back to "one
R. S. Julian," as distinguished from some pa:ramoun t
source. In the very nature of severance, when the two
estates come first into being at that time each estate initiates in some individual as distinguished from sovereignty.
It was and is fairly inferable from Eckman's pleading
that he claimed that there had been a severance in Julian's time and that a surface estate initiated with Julian.
\Ve find re-inforcement of our position, viz: that, under the law as heretofore announced by the Supreme
Court, the adverse daim must be to the surface alone in
order to have the doctrine of the Chandler Case apply,
by the further circumstance that in that case the rule was
announced and applied that the adverse claimant need
not show payment ,of taxes, if none were lawfully assessed.
Let us suppose that a trespasser goeH into posst>ssiou
of a portion of a mining claim, fences a lot and erects a
cabin. His contention would be that by reason of his possession ,of the surface he was possessed of tht~ subsurface
as well. rt'he answer of the owner of tlw mining claim
would be that the mining claim as such had been assessed
to him and he had paid tlw taxes, henc(~ the adverse claimant could not succeed. vV e do not believe the doctrine of
the Chandler Case allows the adverse claimant to reply,
vVell then, in that ease, all I now claim is the surface. No
taxes have been assessed against the surface, hence I am
entitled to the surface at least in any event.
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If the locus in the case just supposed were non-mineral ground, we are confident that the adverse claiipant
vvould not be permitted to prevail upon any such theory
as the one suggestPd. 'L'wo elementary rules apply to defeat such a theory. In adverse possession it is necessary
that the claimant make claim to the entire title. If his
claim is for less than the fee, he in effect recogni:1;es a
:paramount title. Again his possession must be "exclusive." 'rwo persons cannot hold the same property adversf~ly to each otl!cr at the same time.
There can be
no disseisin unless the rightful owner is altogether depriwd of possession.
''The claim must be of title or ownership in
fee, and to be of any avail must be to the entire
title, not simply to a part of it."
2 Corpus Juris, ''Adverse Possession,'' Sec.
218, page 129.
"However much the courts may disagree in
respect of exclusiveness as an element of advers~.
possession, there is no, nor can there be, dissent
from the proposition that a possession of the adverse claimant in conunon with the rightful owner
is fatally wanting in exclusiveness and can never
ripen into title by adverse possession.''
2 Corpus Juris, ''Adverse Possession,'' Sec.
199, page 120.
vVhat then is the difference between mineral and nonmineral land 1 To say that the fonncr permits of seve ranee
is merely begging the question. To say that the fact that
the statute permits of separate taxation cannot be the
answer, beeause the Chandler Case holds that it is im-
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material ·whether the ~mrfaec-> is taxeLl or not. 'ro say
that it is the use of the surface for other than mining
purposes which works the severance cannot be true because the record owner of the mining claim may himself
mine the mineral:,; beneath and use the surface for a sheep
corral, tlms subjecting the surface to a tax, and no severance results any more than a fee simple title can be
said to be a life estate in the o·wner with remainder over
to his heirs.
Inevitably we are forced to tlw eo11clusion that it is
the adverse "claim" to the surface which is the hasis of
adverse possession of the surface. And that is doing no
more than applying the principle that "intent" is a factor in adverse possession and must he provE>d as part of
the claimant's case. Thus, the entry in the first plare
may be without claim of title, and from the time and only
from the time the claimant makes his <·laim hostilte cl.oes
it bPcome adverse.

At this time perhaps something should be said concerning the so-called ·wilkes Survey of Bingham. In the
Rckman case the opinion recites: "It appears from the
evidenee that the :,;urface area in dispute has for many
years been platted into town lots."
vVhatever the evi<lence may have been in that respE>ct
m the Eckman case, there is no such evidence in the
instant record. If that bPcornes a material factor in this
case, it was incumbent on the defen<lants to make the rec-
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ord under their plea of adverse possession. We submit
with a good deal of confidence that the court cannot take
judicial notice of the -Wilkes Survey or of its history or
of its force and effect. "\Ve say that because our own deiberate inquiry into the matter has failed to enlighten
us. It may be conceded that in 1900 Chas. S. Wilkes was
County Surveyor of Salt Lake County and that as such
he made a survey of Bingham Canyon, that he platted
his notes and submitted the resulting plat to the County
Commissi,oners who approved the same in 1904 and ordered the map filed in the Recorder's Office, where it
hangs to this day. It is evident that since that time transfers ,of real estate have been made, using the Wilkes
plat for purposes of dPscription. It is also evident that
the County Assessor has made similar use of it. But it
does not appear that the -Wilkes Survey was any act of
the property owners themselves or that it affects or purports to affect titles in any way. In short, from all that
appears its force and effect is precisely the same as the
act of the government of Salt Lake City in dividing its
territory into wards and voting districts.

Even if it

·were competent to attempt such a thing, there is nothing
from which the inference can he drawn that the Wilkes
Survey purports to deal with surface area only.

To

the contrary the proof or -offer ·of proof shows that the
-Wilkes Survey has been used by all parties, vendors and
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Yendees, mortgagors and mortgaget~s and the Yarious
county assessors and treas urcrs precisely the same as,
for instance, Salt Lake City Survey. Although the
-Wilkes Survey may be useJ for purposes of description
yet whenever a surface estate is intended apt words of
severance must be used to aeeomplish the purpose. In
any event the burden of proof was upon the defendants
and if the record is lacking it is their concern.
But the defendants did not concPrn themselves with
that matter because tht>y did not claim the surface estate of a mining claim. To the contrary, they claimed
title to non-mineral ground "in fee simple abg.olute exelusive of any other right," and in support of that claim
eontended that the Bentley patent was the superior title,
that inasmuch as the proof showed title in them by mesne
eonveyances from Bentley, they should prevail.
In this state county assessors are not judicial officers. No one can say, until this present case is decided
by the Supreme Court, whether the Bentley patent covered the demanded premises or whether it is a part of a
mining claim.
This reeord shows that two patents issued from the
United States covering the demanded premises-one a
mineral patent and the other an agricultural patent of an
earlier date. If the agricultural patent was paramount,
then no question of surface and sub-surface estates entered in. It was the assessor's duty to assess the premises claimed as agricultural ground thf~ same as other ag-
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ricultural ground, and he~ did just that. The Bentiey patent called for the west half of the east half of the northwest quarter of Section 26. The record shows (proof introduced by the defendants) that the assessor assessed
that acreage as described in the patent until the 'Wilkes
Survey was approved in 1904. Thereafter he assessed
that acreage as theretofore but ''excepting the land included in the Bingham Plats."
\V e submit that there is no opportunity in this case
to contend that the adverse claim was to the surface ·of
a mining claim. 'ro the contrary the rule controlling
this case is the rule announced in Rio Grande Ry. v. S.
L. Investment Co., supra. And all that is said in the
opinion in that case respecting the jurisdietion of county
assessors and the State Board applies in the case at bar.

By the Act of March 11, 1909, it is made the duty of
the State Board of Equalization to ''assess * * * all
property and surface improvements, upon or appurteuaut to mines and mining claims, which have a value separate and independent of all such mines and mining
claims. As soon as sueh as;;;essment is completed a copy
of same must be furni slwd to the owner."
Laws 1909, page 96.
And by the amendnJPnt of March 21, 1919, the following language was added to the foregoing ''and the value
·of auy surface use made of * ~· * mining property
for othE>r than mining purposes."

\Yhenever it becomes material to show that tlw improvements or surface use of a mining claim have been
separately assessed, there is no lack of proof. The only
pmwr to assess that particular property is now lodged in
the State Board. County assessors since 1909 at least
have no such powPr, and by the same token the State
Board could not assess the ·west half of the east half of
the northwest quarter of Section 26, nor any part of it.
If that was assessed, it must have been the work of the
County Assessor, and that is precisely what the proof
shows. And so it is that tlw opinion in the Eckman CasP
says:
"While it is quite clear that in this case the
surface area of the Mirror lode mining claim
* * * was used and improved by the defendant
for other than mining purposes and that such surface area and im.provements had a value separate
and distinct from said mining claim as such, yet
it does not appear that in assessing that mining
claim to appellant, who held the legal title thereof, it wws not assessed to it for all purposes; that
is, for the purpose of a mining claim and also for
such other purposes as the surface thereof was devoted to.''
'l'here ean be no donbt about it that auy official
clmrged with the duty of assessing the McGuire Placer
as a mining claim and its surface

ind<~pendently

luwe aseertained the names of its owners.

could
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Section 5915, C. L. 1917, provides:
''Lands once described on the assessment hook
need not be described a second time, but any person claiming the same and desiring to be assessed
therefor may have his name inserted with that of
the person to whom such land is assessed.''
Throughout the Hevenue Laws it is dear that it is
intended that the owner of property should be advised
of all taxes assess(~d against his property, either by actual.
·uotiee or that au examination of the reeords would reveal
the faetf.;.
lu .:\linnesota a statute provided for the se>parnt<'
taxation of subsurface and surface estates, and the eond
said:
''Manifestly it would have been easy to describe the property taxed as 'Mineral rights' as it
would have been to describe it as 'Surface rights.'
The description used does neither, but is merely
the governmental description. The interest of the
plaintiff in the minerals was plainly real estate,
and properly taxable separately. The law directed the asse,ssing officers to tax it separately. If
the separate interest of the mineral owner is eovered by this description, the result is that his property is taxed without notice to him, under the
guise of taxing the property of another. The
courts do not favor 1such a result. It does not
seem important that the mineral estate may have
escaped taxation. That the assessor omitted to
assess this interest does not influence the decision
in the pn•sent case.''
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·washburn v. Gregory Company, 147 N. W.
706.
And that seems to be the intent of the legislature in
amending Section 5864 as they did after the Eckman
Case was decided, Laws of Utah, 1919, page 319:
''All metalliferous mines or mining claims
both placer and rock in place shall be assessed at
$5.00 per acre. * *' * The value of any surface use made of mining claims or mining property for other than mining purposes shaH be assessed at full value. * * * In all cases where
the surface of lands is owned by one person and
the mineral underlying such lands is owned by
another, such property rights shall be separately
asses1sed to the respective owners.''
Again throughout the Revenue Laws, from the time
the Constitution was adopted, the taxation of mines and
mining properties has been separately treated in the laws
of Utah. Thus in the Assessment Book, ''Mines and
mining claims by name and lot number," are accorded
a separate column. C. L. Section 5909. Again, Section
5916 requires the State Board to supply the several county assessors with a list of all patented mining claims. In
the case at bar no claim was made to the surface of a mining claim; much less was any claim made that the surface
of a mining claim had a ''separate and independent
value" and was either assessed accordingly or that no
taxes were assessed against it. We submit that no one
can ascertain whether or not the -surfaee of a mining
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claim has been separately assessed without finding the
information desired in the separate column of the Assessment Book, ·where it ought to be listed. So far as that
is concerned the proof in the instant case is precisely the
same as it "\vas in the Eckman Case, and as Mr. Justice
Frick observed: "It does not appear that in assessing
that mining- claim * * * it was not assessed for all
purposes; that is for the purpose of a mining- claim and
also for such other purposes as the surface thereof was
devoted to." Indeed, from the decision in Ontario Silver Min. Co. v. Hixon, 49 Utah 359, it is apparent that
g-ood men are apt to differ as to what constitutes "a separate and independent value." It is for the assessor to
decide in the first place and for the courts to review in
a proper case his decision. If, as a matter of law, the
assessor makes a mistake, either in determining that the
surface of a mining claim has a separate and independent value or in determining that it has not, that is no
sound reason why the owner of a patented mining claim
should lose his surface rights on the theory adopted by
an adverse claimant that no taxes were assessed against
the surface, when they ought to have been so assessed;
unless the adverse claimant can bring his case squarely
within the facts of the Candler Case.

It will be remembered that the acreage of the McGuire Placer is 11.79. Until the amendment of 1919
placer mining claims were assessed at the priee per acre
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paid to the government, or $2.30 per acre. After that
time the value was placed arbitrarily at $5.00 per acre for
all mining claims. For a number of years prior to 1919
the McGuire was assessed at $30.00, but periodically the
assessor changed that valuation to $60.00 and again to
$55.00. 'Ve suppose for his purpose the assessor treated
the 11.79 acres as 12 acres, and that the value of $30.00
was reached by multiplying 12 by $2.50 and the value
of $60.00 by mutiplying 12 by $5.00. In any event the
assessed valuation was, strietly speaking, always more
than the statutory rate for a mining claim as such. Even
in 1916, when it ''·Tas valued at ~~55.00, that was before
the amendment of 1919. To argue that the excess may
include a surface value is not appealing to appellants'
counsel. The circumstance is mentioned simply because
the trial court referred to it in deciding the case.

III.
AS TO THE CLAIM OF E.STOPPEL.

There is no evidence whatever in the record and indeed no claim is made that either of the plaintiffs or any
of their co-tenants in the McGuire & Company Placer
ever by word or act made any representation of any kind
to the defendants or to their predecessors in interest ·with
relation to the placer title. There is no assertion that
the owners of thr placer at any time knevv about any of
the tram;fers in <lefendants' allegPd chain of title or that
they were conscious of the fact that any improvements
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of any kind ·were about to be placed upon the ground
before they were completed, until perhaps Michael Gibbons saw certain construction going on in late September,
1924. It appears from the defendants' answer that in
that month structures which had theretofore been on the
premises were destroyed by fire and that thereupon the
Utah Copper Company, having acquired an alleged title
to the ground, commenced building a hospital on about the
23rd day of September, 1924, and that the construction
·was completed on the lOth day of April, 1925, at a cost
of about $23,000.00. It also appears, however, from the
answer that on the 30th day of October, 1924, and prior
to thE' time that any conveyance was placed of record
from R. G. Frazier to the Utah Copper Company, the
plaintiff served a notice on Frazier protesting against the
erection of any building, and asserted the placer title. It
is apparent from the answer that this notice was received
within about a week after the first acts were done upon
the ground indicating that any one intended to build a
building thereon.
It further appears from the evidence that the notice
of the location of the McGuire & Company Placer was
recorded in the Lower Placer Mining District of Salt
Lake County on the 26th day of October, 1875, and in
the Office of the County Recorder on the 13th day of
February, 1880, and that the patent was recorded in the
Office of the County Recorder June 12, 1897. The first
conveyance in the d(~fendants' alleged chain of title was
that of one S. S. Maxwell to F. E. Straup, which bore
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date the 16th day of -:\fay, lS99. Both the aus\ver and
the testimony show that 'Whatever possession Max\vell
took of the ground and whatever improvements he erected
thereon were made long subsequent to the recording of
the location notice in the Office of the County Recorder.
To summarize, we have a case then where it is
claimed, that an owner of ground, claiming under instruments which were at all times duly recorded in the Office
of the County Rocorcler of the county wherein the land
lay, is estopped by reason of the fact that conveyances
of which he knew nothing in advance passed between
third parties, who so far as the record shows \Vere strangers to him, and because trespassers upon his ground
erected improvements thereon, although it does not appear that he knew in advance that they intended so to
do or that he knew what was going on during the process
of building until finally some improvements were eoinmenced of which he did have knowledge, whereupon he
protested. It must be remembered that in this case there
is no claim whatever that the plaintiff s or any of their
1

(~o-tenants

by any representations or act or deed of theirs

ever at any time misled anyone in the defendants' chain
of title or that the owners of the placer ever did anything
in an affirmative way to encourage the conveyances or the
erection of the improvements.
~We respectfully submit that under such circmnstances as these, no estoppel arises.
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The defendants and their predecessors in interest are
charged under our law with knowledge of the plaintiffs'
title by

n~ason

of the fact that the instruments under

which the plaintiffs claimed were at all times of record.
Section 4900 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, rea(h;
as follows:
"Every conveyance or illlstrument in writing
affecting real estate executed, acknowledged, or
proved, and certified in t~e manner prescribed by
this title, and every patent to lands within this
:,;tate duly executed and verified according to law,
and every judgment, order, or decree of any court
of record in this state, or a copy thereof, required
by law to be recorded in the office of the county
recorder, shall, from the time ·of filing the same
with the recorder for record, impart notice to all
persons of the contents thereof, and subsequent
purchasers, mortgagees, and lien-holders shall be
deemed to purchase and take with notice."
Every person vvho is alleged by the defendants to
have erected any substantial improvements on this
ground claims to have purchased after the record of the
McGuire title. It follows therefore that under the statute the defendants and each of the predecessors was
charged with knowledge of the frailties of his own title
and the existence of the title to the McGuire. The Supreme Court of Utah, in Poynter v. Chipman, 8 Utah 442,
at page 451, says:

GO

"* * '~ 'I'he princi1)le invoh:od by this request is that one should be estopped from asserting a right to property upon which he has, by his
own conduct, misled another, who supposed himself to be the owner, or to have a right to make
expenditures thereon. 'But this salutary principle cannot be invoked by one who, at the time the
improvements were made, was acquainted ·with tho
true character of his own ti.tle, or with the fact that
he had none.' Brant v. Iron Co., 93 U.S. 326; Henshaw v. Bissell, 18 \Vall. 255; Steel v. Refining
Co., 106 U. S. 45G, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389. It cannot
be contomle<l that the defendent did not know all
aLout the title to the land at this time.
*"
Tlw Supreme Conrt in \Vis<>r v. Lawler, 189 li. ~:).
:2GO, 23 Sup. Ct. H<~p. 624, nso;-; tlw follow in~~· lang;m1~e:
"But, conceding defendants to have been apprised of the contents of the prospectus, it would
eertainly be an exceptional case if a person holding a deed of property which he has placed upon
record would ho bound to disclose his title ~v a
person contemplating pmchasing or making improvements upon the land, or would be estopped
from making his claim thereto by mere silence,
sine<:> he has a right to rely upon the constructive
notice giv<>n hy the record; although the rule would
he othen,·is<~ in ease of positive misrepresentations upon his part. Brant v. Virginia Ooal & I.
Co., 93 U. S. 32G, 337, 23 L. Ed. 927, 929; Knouff
v. Thompson, 1 6 Pa. 357; Brinckerhoff v. Lansing,
4 .T olms. Ch. 65, 8 Am. Dec. 538; Rico v. Dewey.
54 Barb. 455; King-man v. Graham, 51 \Vis. 232,
8 N. \V. 181; Sulphine v. Dunbar, 55 Miss. 255;
Port(~r v. ·wheeler, 105 Ala. 451, 17 So. 221. The
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authoritieR also recogmr.e a distinction between
mere silence and a deceptive silence accompanied
by an intention to defraud, which amounts to a
poHitive beguilement. Sumner v. Seaton, 47 N.J.
Eq. 103, 19 Atl. 884; Hill v. Epley, 31 Pa. 331;
l\larklmm v. 0 'Connor, 52 Ga. 183, 21 Am. Rep.
2"19.

'' * * *:' It cannot bo that A would be
estopped by silence with respect to his title to
property which B is about to purchae.e, when he
has no knowledge that B contemplates buying and
B has no knowledge that A is connected with the
vroperty. \V c know of no case holding that a man
is (•stopped by silmce as against the public, or any
particular person with whom he has no fiduciary
l'Plation."
'I'll(' rule is j)]'Operly amJotmecd in 10 R. C. L. at

pa~~·p

W:J, as follows:

' ;X!

And where the foundation for a
*
claimed estoppel is silence or omission to give notice of one's rights, the party relying thereon must
not have had the means of knowing the true· state
of facts, as by reference to the public records;
estoppel by silence differing, apparently, in this
respect from the class of estoppels resulting from
affirmative acts or conduct.''
''A public record is an available means of information as to questions of title, and one who
(!oos not tah:e advantage of it cannot claim an
estoppel against one who merely fails to furnish
sueh information. And it has been held that he
\\'ill not be estopped by his si l<~nce, although he
may know or be informed tbat others are nego-
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tiating for rights and interest's in property bound
by his title of record, as he is under no obligation
to warn or apprise them of that which the record
discloses, but there is authority to the contrary.''
21 Corpus Juris 1130.
~While

it is there said that there is authority to th(•

contrary, it will be readily seen that the vast weight of
the decided cases is in accordance with the plaintiff's
position. Furthermore, one of the cases cited to the contrary is properly interpreted by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of \Viser v. Lawler, supra.
The only other case cited to the contrary is that of Kmgman v. Graham, 8 N. \V. 181. In that case, however, the
court uses the following language:

"* " " No one, however, is under any obligation to exercise care or diligence to prevent
another ',s being defrauded in a transaction to
whieh he is not a party. In this class of cases a
person is estopped because he has not spoken
when he ought to have spoken. The duty to speak
rests upon the knowledge that another is about to
act in ignorance of the truth. Thus, where the
title has been duly recorded, it may fairly be presumed that subsequent purchasers have used the
means pointed out by law and acquired all the
knowledge which it is important for them to have,
or that they will do so. When, however, the owner
is directly apprised of the ignorance of the buyer,
and of his purpose to act in such ignorance, he
cannot claim the benefit of this principle, because
good faith then requires him to speak.''
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It can scarcely be contended that the defendants have
brought themselves even to the most remote degree within any of these rules.
In the case of St. Louis Smelting & Refining Company v. Green, 13 Feel. 208, the court held that the party
to vvhom the alleged representations were made must he
ignorant of the truth, and that in view of the fact that
the person against whom the estoppel was af3serted had
in the course of proceedings for a patent of a mining
claim given notice as required by law of his application
for patent, it could not be said that he had stood by without giving notice. In the case at bar the person against
whom the estoppel is asserted not only gave notice of his
claim of title but he gave that notice in accordance with
the recording acts and in such a way that the defendants
and none of their predecessors in interest will be heard
in any court to deny that they knew so much about the
plaintiffs' title as the plaintiffs themselves knew.
Moreover, in the case of St. Louis Smelting & Refining Company v. Green, supra, the court used the following language:
"Assuming, however, that for the purpose of
this decision the defendants did stand in the relation .of owners of th~s land at the time, I do not
think this principle of the law of estoppel can be
earried so far as to hold that even the owner of
real estate who stands by and sees another make
improvements upon it, and makes no objection, is
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thereby estopped thereafter to claim the title of
the real estate; he may be estopped to claim the
improvements, but I do not think that he is
estopped to claim the title in an action of ejectment.''
This brings us aptly to the consideration of another
phase of the matter. It is claimed that there is now upon
the ground a hospital erected at a cost of $23,000.00 or
thereabouts by the defendant, Utah Copper Company,
in all good faith and relying upon its title to the g-round.
If the effect of the plaintiffs' action could be to take im-

provements of great value erected innocently and in good
faith away from the defendants and give them to the
plaintiffs, then we can readily imagine that a court would
be very reluctant to enter such a judgment.

Time and

again our own Supreme Court and the courts of other
jurisdictions and text writers have adverted to the fact
that in order to create such an estoppel the person asserting it must have acted upon the representations to his in-

jury.

~Without

the injury, the estoppel does not arise.

Brigham Young Trust Co. v. Wagener, 12 Utah 1, at
page 11. Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Edition,
page 1642, also page 1645. 21 C. J. 1135.
Under the laws of this state, the so-called occupying
claimant's act (Compiled Laws, Utah, 1917, Sections 5031
to 5035) will give to the defendants a complete and adequate reimbursement against any loss in case judgment
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is entered against them if it is found they acted on good
faith in the construction of their building. Of course the
question of the Tights of the Utah Copper Company in
this respect are not at this time before the court, but it
will always have opportunity in a proper proceeding instituted in due season to set up its claims in this particular.

Fares v. Urban, 46 Utah 609, 151 Pac. 57. As no

injury can befall defendants by reason of their expenditures if madP in good faith there is no estoppel.
Properly analyzed the position of the defendants
seems to be this; that although they and all their predecessors in interest, when they undertook to traffic with
this land, to trespass upon it, to take it for their

OWll

uses

and purposes all(} to do whatever they did do with relation to it, were charged with knowledge of the plaintiffs'
right in the premises, they can nevertheless by the simple
device of treating those rights as if they did not exist,
fiually prevail upon a court to take the same attitude.
'rhis as we have seen is not the law.
Au abstract of title is in evidence here. It shows
everything respecting the McGuire Placer that Dr.
Straup, Dr. Castleman, Dr. Ray, Dr. Frazier and the Utah
Copper Company could have seeu, if they had done what
even the most simple minded citizen would have done,
·when contemplating the purchase of real estate. Each
and all of those witne"se>s fraukly ndmitted that, when
he purchased, he d(•lilwrately "took a chance" on tho tith~.
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None of them examined the records. And yet the trial
court found in Conclusion No. III that these plaintiffs
"ought not in equity be allowed to proceed against said
defendants,''
Respectfully submitted,

B. L. LIBERMAN,
R. A. McBROOM,
GEO. Y. vVALLACE,
Attorneys for Appellants.

